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I
n Hu and Ors v Immigration and Protection Tribunal
[2017] NZHC 41, Palmer J has continued his form in
tackling the hard issues in administrative law.
(Un)reasonableness as a ground of judicial review has
long been the fly in the administrative law ointment. Attempts
at creating some sense of coherence or simplicity in the field
are routinely undone when it comes to reasonableness. It is
(so to speak) reasonably straightforward to explain why an
administrative decision is reviewable on the basis of proce-
dural unfairness or illegality. Explaining why, on the other
hand, a court can (and should) intervene because a decision is
‘unreasonable’ is anything but straightforward, and a prob-
lem that Palmer J noted in Hu and Ors v Immigration and
Protection Tribunal has “bedevilled” judicial review. In Hu,
he has attempted to solve this old problem with an old
solution.
THE CONTINUATION OF A TREND
Before this article looks to his decision in Hu, it is worth
noting that since his appointment to the bench in 2015,
Palmer J has been on the vanguard of fighting the difficult
battles in administrative law. In Deliu v Connell [2016]
NZHC 1080, [2016] NZAR 475 he noted, at [6], that the
“intensity of the standard of judicial review that should be
applied has vexed the New Zealand courts in recent years”,
lamenting the Supreme Court’s dogged refusal to provide
guidance for determining the appropriate standard of review.
While he accepted the issues that arise from formal guidance,
he posited that some direction was needed, lest the extant
confusion lead to more litigation, uncertainty and “diminu-
tion of the rule of law” (at [7]). Citing Bree Huntley (“Judi-
cial Review of Administrative Interpretations: Lessons for
New Zealand from the United States” (2015) 25 NZULR
791 at 817) at [8], he engaged in the strongest (albeit veiled)
admonition of the Supreme Court’s lack of action to date:
This judgment is not the place to propose a new approach
to the intensity of judicial review. But I do agree that ‘it
would be desirable for New Zealand courts to engage
more openly with the matters that influence the allocation
ofinterpretativeauthoritybetweenthecourtsandadministrators’.
Later in the year, in AI v Immigration and Protection Tribu-
nal [2016] NZHC 2227, [2016] NZAR 1471, Palmer J had
the (perhaps dubious) honour of being the first New Zealand
judge to cite Dennis Denuto — a fictional advocate in the
Australian cult film The Castle — in a judgment. Yet for all
the light-heartedness of referencing a film beloved in legal
circles on both sides of the Tasman, the point in his doing so
was an important one. The applicant was seeking review of
the Tribunal’s decision to decline his application for refugee
status, and his first ground was reliance on the ‘innominate
ground of review’. This esoteric ground takes its name from
the reference to it by Lord Donaldson in the English case of R
v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, Ex parte Guinness Plc
[1990] 1 QB 146 (CA), where his Lordship described it as
where “something had gone wrong of a nature and degree
which required the intervention of the court” (at 159–160).
As Palmer J noted, however, counsel and courts have
perennially misunderstood this as inviting the court “to
strike down a decision of a public body based on a court’s
instinct as to whether ‘something has gone wrong’” (at [43]).
In reality, Lord Donaldson did not intend to create an addi-
tional, stand-alone ground of review, and instead was argu-
ing that the nature of the decision-maker and context of the
decision are important factors to consider when determining
whether the court should intervene. Such a misunderstand-
ing about the ‘innominate ground’ is perhaps explainable
(and expected) due to Cooke P’s reference to Lord Donaldson’s
statement in Thames Valley Electric Power Board v NZFP
Pulp & Paper Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 641 when describing the
ground of “substantive unfairness”, namely “where the pro-
cedure and the decision of an administrative body, although
possibly just surviving challenge if viewed separately, were in
combination so questionable as to impel the conclusion that
…somethinghadgonewrong”(at652–3).Givingthe innominate
ground a name gave it currency, and the two have been
somewhat interchangeable since. However, to the very lim-
ited extent substantive unfairness was successfully pleaded in
New Zealand, as Wild J noted in Air New Zealand Ltd v
Wellington International Airport Ltd [2009] NZAR 138,
variable intensity of review meant that it was no longer
necessary, allowing him to declare substantive unfairness as
having “met an end, and … no longer a tenable stand-alone
ground for review” (at [34]). Of course, this did not prevent
applicants pleading “substantive unfairness” as a last resort
when conventional grounds of review failed; pleadings unfor-
tunately entertained by courts despite Wild J’s attempted
euthanising of the concept.
In acknowledging substantive unfairness’s existence in AI,
Palmer J was not of the same view as Wild J, and he
maintained the position that the ‘innominate ground’ and
‘substantive unfairness’ are different concepts; indeed, he
went so far as to generously suggest that Cooke P had not
conflated the concepts in Thames Valley. However, to the
extent that applicants rely on either concept to justify inter-
vention by the court simply based on an ‘instinct’, his posi-
tion was clear: such a generic “something has gone wrong”
interpretation of the innominate ground of judicial review is
unavailable. Referencing Mr Denuto, he noted, at [44], that
“‘[t]he vibe’ can be a valuable reality check as to the interests
of justice, but it is not a legal test”. Moreover, without clear
parameters, such a ground would lack the determinacy needed
to prevent the court intervening on an unprincipled basis.
Accordingly (at [46]):
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… if ‘something’ has gone wrong, sufficient to warrant a
court interfering in the decision-making of a public body,
the court ought to be able to describe what that ‘some-
thing’ is so as to justify with reasons why it is unlawful.
One wonders whether Palmer J could have gone further.
Referring to substantive unfairness as a stand-alone ground
of review is disappointing, in that it opens the door firmly
shut (for principled reasons) by Wild J in Air New Zealand,
and runs contrary to the generally-accepted position that it is
a relic which today, is “no more than a formulation to
describe unreasonableness” (GDS Taylor Judicial Review: A
New Zealand Perspective (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2014),
[14.56]). More concerning is the lack of a definitive state-
ment of what the ‘innominate ground’ actually is, if it is
anything at all. Without clearly defining its limited use, or
questioning its continued existence, Palmer J risks his state-
ments being ignored by applicants in future proceedings.
Nevertheless, such analysis and clarification is warmly wel-
comed. As recently as 2014 the ‘innominate ground’ was
defined as “where the Court decides something has gone
wrong but cannot put the defect or defects into an existing
ground” (Te Ua v Secretary for War Pensions [2014] NZHC
1050, n 25). To the extent that the innominate ground exists,
it cannot be on such loose terms, which practically encour-
ages applicants for review to have an additional bite of the
cherry where orthodox grounds of review have failed.
Lastly, just before Christmas, Palmer J issued his judg-
ment in Wu and Ors v Minister of Immigration [2016]
NZHC 3194, which contains significant analysis on a decision-
maker’s duty to self-inquire (space constrains prevent further
analysis at this juncture). This meant that in the space of a
year, Palmer J issued three separate and influential judgments
tackling administrative law issues; a trend continued in Hu.
THE CASE IN HU
Like AI, Hu was an application for review of a decision by
the Immigration and Protection Tribunal. Mr Jingquing Hu
and Ms Guifeng Li, Chinese citizens, had four children. They
had been in New Zealand since 2003, but attempts to gain
residency here by Hu and Li had failed, and they became
eligible for deportation on 1 October 2015. They appealed
against deportation on humanitarian grounds to the Tribu-
nal, which despite finding serious character issues with Hu
and Li, granted temporary visas to the family to enable their
older daughter to complete secondary school. Hu and Li
sought leave to review the decision, which Heath J granted
on the basis that the Tribunal’s decision to only issue tempo-
rary visas was arguably unreasonable “in the administrative
law sense” ([2016] NZHC 1661).
Reasonableness as the sole ground of review in the pro-
ceedings perhaps justified Palmer J’s extensive examination
of the concept. He began with an analysis of Associated
Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corpora-
tion [1948] 1 KB 223, which “however often it is dispar-
aged” remains the leading case in the area (at [23]). The
cause of the disparagement is, inter alia, the risk of Wednesbury
unreasonableness allowing a court to overturn a decision
with which it simply disagrees. However, as Palmer J noted
“courts are reluctant to dispense with the potential, excep-
tional, use of unreasonableness without having something
more satisfactory with which to replace it. No alternative has
sustained sufficient attraction to recommend itself” (at [26]).
However, the larger problem with Wednesbury is not the risk
of ushering in merits-review, but instead that its test for
unreasonableness — “a conclusion so unreasonable that no
reasonable authority could ever have come to it” is “surely
tautological”. Wednesbury’s uselessness in guiding courts as
to what makes a decision unreasonable is usually the cause of
the derision it attracts: “[t]he problem is that little progress
has been made in unpacking what unreasonableness means”
(at [25]). And thus, Palmer J embarked upon unpacking the
oft used and despised concept.
Justice Palmer’s first step was to look at how “unreason-
ableness” is engaged in another context — errors of law.
Lord Radcliffe famously encapsulated the two types of errors
of law in Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14 (HL). The first
was an ex facie or simple misconstruction of the law. The
second involved a situation where “there is no evidence to
support the determination”; “one in which the evidence is
inconsistent with, and contradictory of, the determination”;
or “one in which the the true and only reasonable conclusion
contradicts the determination” (at [36]). That second type of
error of law was expressed by the New Zealand Supreme
Court in Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd [2005] NZSC 34,
[2005] 3 NZLR 721 at [26] as a situation when “an ultimate
conclusion of a fact-finding body [is] so insupportable — so
clearly untenable — as to amount to an error of law, because
proper application of the law requires a different answer”.
Justice Palmer was of the view that the second type of error of
law “offers a better account of unreasonableness constitut-
ing illegality in judicial review than the circular words used in
Wednesbury” (at [29]), which is doubtless the case.
The definition in Edwards v Bairstow and Bryson pro-
vides “a relatively narrow but usable concept of unreason-
ableness”, and allows either an assessment of the adequacy
of evidence that leads to an ultimate conclusion, or an
assessment of “the chain of logical reasoning in the applica-
tion of the law to the facts: if there is a material disconnect in
the chain of logic from a fact or a legal proposition to a
conclusion, a decision may be unreasonable and therefore
unlawful” (at [30]). As Palmer J noted, “this sense of unrea-
sonableness is relatively unremarkable”, and although he did
not wish to “claim this is an all-encompassing conception of
the meaning unreasonableness … it does provide some opera-
tional content to what is otherwise relatively inchoate” (at
[31]). Finally, citing his judgment in Deliu v Connell, Palmer
J noted the existence of variable intensity of review, and that
“[l]abels such as ‘hard look’ and ‘anxious scrutiny’ may not
be a particularly helpful guide to a court’s approach … there
is no doubt the New Zealand courts will focus very carefully
on cases where human rights are at stake” (at [33]).
Thus, unpacked, Palmer J provided a new working defi-
nition of reasonableness that would replace Wednesbury
unreasonableness, but would not necessarily apply in all
situations. In the circumstances at hand, Palmer J did not
hold the decision of the Tribunal met the relevant threshold:
it conclusion was supported by the evidence, and he did “not
consider there is a defect in the chain of logical reasoning
from the Tribunal’s factual findings or legal propositions to
its conclusion that would render its conclusion unreasonable
or irrational at law” (at [36]). On this basis, Palmer J rejected
the application for judicial review.
ANALYSIS
There is much to make of Palmer J’s decision in Hu. The first
point to note is that Palmer J’s reconceptualisation of reason-
ableness worked remarkably well in practice. By applying the
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error of law framework, Palmer J was able to easily assess the
evidence and the logic that the Tribunal based its decision
upon, and provide an explanation as to why that made its
decision reasonable. The sheer ability to articulate the rea-
sons for his conclusion about why the ground of reasonable-
ness failed in and of itself represents a significant improvement
to the status quo. As Palmer J notes, the best a court could do
when applying Wednesbury unreasonableness was simply
state that this was not a decision that no reasonable decision-
maker would have arrived at, or, subvert its uselessness by
covertly applying a different test; there are staggeringly few
decisions where the court has applied Wednesbury in good
faith and arrived at the conclusion that the decision-maker
was unreasonable.
After seeing the efficacy of this reconceptualisation in
action, one might wonder, given Wednesbury was decided in
1948, and Edwards v Bairstow in 1956, why it took 60 years
for a New Zealand judge to come up with the “relatively
unremarkable” idea of using the latter decision to provide a
workable concept of reasonableness when the former’s encap-
sulation was so deficient. The answer lies in traditional
distinction between ‘error of law’ and ‘unreasonableness’ as
separate grounds of review.
In his judgment, Palmer J cites Council of Civil Service
Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 364 to
show his adoption of the Edwards v Bairstow formulation
was consistent with Lord Diplock’s term ‘irrationality’ — an
alternative to ‘unreasonableness’ — in that it should focus on
logical connections. However, in that decision, famous for
establishing the grounds of review analysis that is still canon
today, Lord Diplock in fact separates the two concepts
(at 410):
… resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount
Radcliffe’s ingenious explanation in Edwards v Bairstow
[1956] AC 14 of irrationality as a ground for a court’s
reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though
unidentifiable mistake of law by the decision-maker. ‘Irra-
tionality’ by now can stand upon its own feet as an
accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by
judicial review.
Thus, despite once being intertwined, thereafter, the two
concepts became different grounds of review. The second
type of error of law in Edwards v Bairstow and the formu-
lation adopted by Palmer J is usually restricted to situations
where a decision-maker’s conclusion is unsupported by the
facts before it (see, for example, Matthew Smith Judicial
Review Handbook (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2016)
at §53.6). Unreasonableness as a ground faces no such
restriction. There are doubtless similarities, but the nuanced
distinction explains why the Court of Appeal in Lewis v
Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546 at [64] stated that
Wednesbury unreasonableness “may be viewed as coinciding
with the second category of error of law recognised in
Edwards v Bairstow, although it is usually treated as a
distinct ground”. Taylor in his text is far more dismissive
at [14.48]: “it is unnecessary to try to deal with [error of law]
as a species of unreasonableness”.
Such distinctions may appear to verge on pedantry given
the positive practical effect of Palmer J’s reconceptualisation.
Indeed, Palmer J’s desire for “the law of judicial review [to]
avoid the austere rigidity of tabulated legal categorisation”
(AI at [40]) perhaps indicates that he viewed the formal
separation of these overlapping grounds as no barrier to their
pragmatic (re)connection. However, acknowledging the his-
torical context that originally did not formally separate the
two concepts would have allowed Palmer J to further justify
his reconceptualisation as nothing more than a reversion to
that original state of affairs.
Beyond Palmer J’s analysis in Hu, such a reconceptualisa-
tion of reasonableness has only received scant judicial atten-
tion. Chief Justice Elias’s dicta in Lewis echoed her earlier
statement in CMP v D-GSW [1997] NZFLR 1 at 38 that the
two “shade” into one another. More recently, Clifford J
acknowledged that the two grounds are in “close alignment”
when assessing the sufficiency of a decision-maker’s reasons
(Bell v Victoria University of Wellington HC Wellington,
CIV-2009-485-002634 8 December 2010 at [123]). Other
cases have simply substituted the two concepts without much
thought (Minister of Immigration v Vilceanu HC Wellington
CIV 2007-485-835, 11 December 2007 at [38]; Re Vixen
Digital Ltd [2003] NZAR 418 at [44]) adding credence to
Palmer J’s suggestion that his reconceptualistion was unre-
markable. Mark Aronson has had form in suggesting an
alignment, and has written of the battle that one of the
godfathers in administrative law — Stanley de Smith — lost
in trying to prevent unreasonableness from becoming a ground
of review independent of error of law (‘Unreasonableness
and Error of Law’ [2001] UNSW Law J 26 at [10]). More
recently, he looked at whether error of law can accommodate
variable intensity of review (“Should we have a variable error
of law standard?” in Hanna Wilberg and Mark Elliot (eds)
The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing
Taggart’sRainbow (Hart,Oxford,2015)at241).Theapproaches
of other jurisdictions that Aronson in that piece details may
provide models for New Zealand to replicate. These are all
strong indications that while Palmer J’s ideas may not be new,
nor particularly en vogue, they are worthy of exploration
and engagement by other judges and commentators.
Which is why, beyond the lack of historical context, the
major lamentation about an otherwise bold judgment in Hu
is its lack of engagement and exploration with variable
intensity of review. From his judgment in Deliu, it is clear
that Palmer J is one of many judges that would appreciate
more guidance from higher courts about the calibration of
that intensity. He is doubtless correct that the mere appella-
tion of different levels of intensity (“hard look”; “anxious
scrutiny”) is unhelpful without guidance as to how to arrive
at those levels. However, simply stating that “there is no
doubt the New Zealand courts will focus very carefully on
cases where human rights are at stake” is a missed opportu-
nity, in that it does not engage with the broader issue of
calibrating variable intensity, nor with other judges engaging
in similar analyses of reasonableness, most notably Dun-
ningham J in Watson v Chief Executive of Department of
Corrections [2015] NZHC 1227; [2015] NZAR 1049. Hu
has the potential to contribute to a wider and ongoing
debate, but in failing to engage with other decisions, also
risks being isolated.
Nevertheless, Palmer J’s work in administrative law in the
last twelve months — and doubtless, his work to come — has
invigorated an area desperately in need of concerted atten-
tion and analysis. While one has good historical reasons to be
pessimistic about whether his efforts will lead to lasting
reform — as noted above, Wild J’s work on substantive
unfairness in Wellington Airport was largely ignored by
higher courts, so too was his own valiant attempt at refor-
mulating reasonableness in Wolf v Minister of Immigration
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[2004] NZAR 414 — there is also cause to be optimistic. The
Court of Appeal, at least, may have taken note of his demand
in Deliu for more guidance; by October 2016, only a month
after it was decided, that Court was linking to the “useful
discussion” on the innominate ground found in AI (Kumar v
Minister of Immigration [2016] NZAR 1591 at n 9). How-
ever, if we are to see real, substantive and worthwhile progress
in New Zealand administrative law, more than simple link-
ing to High Court judgments is required. Both the Court of
Appeal and Supreme Court must engage in and continue the
important discussions that Palmer J has started in Deliu, AI,
Wu and, most importantly, Hu. Otherwise, like Wild J,
Palmer J may find that all this promising work is for naught.
❒
Continued from page 47
Disputes Tribunal and the courts. For example, terms that
limit or attempt to limit a business’s liability for loss or
damage suffered as a result of the failure of the goods or
services will breach s 43(1) of the CGA as well as s 13(i) of
the FTA.
TERMS MAY NOT BE VALIDLY INCORPORATED
INTO CONTRACTS
In many of the contracts which a consumer could enter into
online, the consumer was able to purchase goods and services
without first being able to see the terms. The failure to make
consumers scroll through the terms before accepting them
leaves companies open to the argument that terms have not
been incorporated into the contract validly and thus not
being bound by certain terms. The incorporation of terms
issue will rise in prominence as finding that terms have not
been incorporated into contracts will be a way for the Dis-
putes Tribunal and the courts to refuse to enforce unfair
contract terms.
Indeed, a significant number of contracts did not require
the consumer to assent to the terms of the contract. There are
two main ways that terms are imposed, or attempted to be
imposed,onconsumers, througheitherclickwraporbrowsewrap
licences. With clickwrap licences, the first, and best way, is
for consumers to be required to click on an “I agree” or
similar box or button-provided, plus of course requiring the
consumer to at least scroll through all the terms of the
contract. A more common way was to require consumers to
tick a box indicating their acceptance of the terms which
were often on a separate page which the consumer would
most likely not read. A disturbing way was for the “I agree”
or similar box to be pre-ticked by the business, thus there was
no positive assent by the consumer.
In contrast to clickwrap licences where at least there was
some indication that terms would be imposed on the trans-
action, with browsewrap licences the terms and conditions
are contained somewhere on the website with statements
such as “[e]ach time you use our Website you have agreed to
be bound by these Terms as they then read”. Consumers who
place orders online may well be unaware that any terms are
attempting to be imposed upon them when browsewrap
licences are used.
TERMS WERE NOT ALWAYS CONTAINED IN
ONE DOCUMENT
The majority (75.44 per cent) of contracts were provided in
one document or area while the remainder (24.56 per cent)
were not. The failure to provide contractual terms in a single
document creates difficulties for consumers as they are required
to read across a number of documents to locate the terms to
which they have agreed.
LEGISLATION MENTIONED
Half of the contracts made no mention of specific consumer
legislation, and only a couple actually stated what rights
consumers had. It would be useful for the Consumer Guar-
antees Act to be amended and there be a requirement to
include specific wording in contracts as is the case in Austra-
lia. Regulation 90 of the Competition and Consumer Regu-
lations 2010 (Cth) requires the following wording to be used
on all product warranty information given to customers,
including terms and conditions of sale: “[o]ur goods come
with guarantees that cannot be excluded under the Austra-
lian Consumer Law. You are entitled to a replacement or
refund for a major failure and compensation for any other
reasonably foreseeable loss or damage. You are also entitled
to have the goods repaired or replaced if the goods fail to be
of acceptable quality and the failure does not amount to a
major failure”.
CONCLUSION
Given the continued high prevalence of unfair contract terms
in consumer contracts in New Zealand, to say there is a law
against unfair contract terms is almost meaningless. Indeed,
the flouting of the UCT may result in perverse and unin-
tended consequences. Because the Commerce Commission
will be unable to intervene in all but the rarest cases, the
Disputes Tribunals and the courts will face situations where
they are being asked to enforce terms that are obviously
unfair. Most Disputes Tribunals referees and judges will be
loath to enforce such terms and will look to ways to avoid
implementing them. One way will be to find that terms have
not been validly incorporated into contracts with the result
that such terms will be unenforceable.
Alternatively, and preferably, the UCT needs to be amended
to bring it in line with Australia’s UCT — New Zealand’s
UCT was taken from Australia. Two of the many changes
that need to be made to achieve harmonisation with Austra-
lia are that, first, consumers should be given standing to
challenge unfair contract terms, and not merely have the
right to request that the Commerce Commission seek a
declaration that a term is unfair and thus unenforceable. The
Commerce Commission has no positive duty to go to court to
seek a declaration. Second, the Disputes Tribunal should
have the jurisdiction to hear claims from consumers about
potential unfair contract terms. ❒
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